Competition closed?

Apple has upset the developers (and users) of thousands of adult-themed apps, which it has pulled from its iPhone app store in the past few days.

One developer accused Apple of “experimenting with our livelihoods” and said the iPhone ecosystem was being “run by puritans”. However, Apple argued that it had received thousands of complaints from customers, in particular women and parents, objecting to material such as “Wobble” – an app which displayed pictures of women’s breasts.

This story demonstrates the effects of one of the growing trends in computing over the past couple of years: the adoption of closed platforms for mobile computing. Apple has led the way in this, but other platforms – such as Moblin, Android and Nokia’s Ovi store – are now encouraging (or even requiring) users to obtain their software from official app stores.

The point is not whether those who control these platforms are puritans or libertarians: rather, it is that (unlike “traditional” open computing systems) the applications which users can install and run on their devices are under that control in the first place. This is a significant change in computing practice, and the rows such as that over adult iPhone apps may be what propels this from being a “geek” issue to one of wider concern. (What happens when China, say, requires Apple to block politically-unacceptable apps?)

I wonder also how long it will be before someone brings a challenge against Apple and other gatekeepers under competition law. In the context of UK and EU competition law, there would seem a good case for saying that Apple has a “dominant market position” in the iPhone apps market – after all, setting aside “jailbroken” iPhones, its app store has a 100% market share for iPhone apps.

Developers finding themselves locked out of the iPhone app store may well consider Apple to be abusing that dominant position, in breach of competition law – especially given the rather different treatment of apps for “established” adult entertainment brands, such as Playboy, whose own app apparently remains available.

It would be interesting if the European Commission ended up forcing Apple (and others) to open up their platforms – though perhaps the market will take care of it in the meantime, as platform owners decide the risks of relaxing their grip on their devices are outweighed by the consequences of having to get involved in controversies such as that over Wobble and its fellow apps.

“Independently safeguarding” children’s websites

The new Independent Safeguarding Authority is attracting a lot of media coverage today, with news stories focusing in particular on compulsory registration for those regularly giving children lifts to social/sports clubs.

However, those operating websites (and other “interactive communication services”) for children should be aware that their activities may also fall within the ISA’s remit when the new regime becomes fully operational in just over a year’s time. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Children Act 2006 (PDF) defines the “regulated activities relating to children” for which ISA-registration is required. These include:

moderating a public electronic interactive communication service which is likely to be used wholly or mainly by children

(see paragraph 2(1) of Part 1 of Schedule 4, on p.67 of the linked PDF).

So if you are operating a website for children, anyone involved in “moderating” that site will need to be registered with the ISA. “Moderating” involves any function relating to:

  • monitoring content;
  • removing or blocking content; or
  • controlling access to, or use of, the service,

for the purposes of protecting children, where individual concerned either has access to the content involved or contact with users of the service (see paras 2(4) and 2(5), Sch.4 Part 1).

Equivalent provisions apply to those operating websites and other interactive services for vulnerable adults.

Employers who engage people who are not ISA-registered, or who are recorded by the ISA as being barred from working with children or vulnerable adults, could face a £5,000 fine or even imprisonment. The ISA website summarises employers’ obligations in more detail.

Paid employees will need to pay a £64 fee to register with the ISA (registration is free for volunteers). For existing employees, in all likelihood it will be the employers who end up paying these fees. Any barred individual is committing a criminal offence by being engaged in any regulated activity, even as a volunteer.

This new regime is still some way off from coming fully into force. The ISA will start the registration process in July 2010, and the legal requirement on employers to check employees’ status will only come into force in November 2010. However, businesses involved in regulated activities – including children’s websites and interactive services – should be making plans to ensure their staff are registered in a timely fashion next summer.

Disclaimed?

One of the most unloved (and unread) features of commercial websites, the “disclaimer”, may have been given a new lease of life by a recent court decision which appears to have endorsed a disclaimer as a means of avoiding liability for inaccurate statements made on a website. However, in my view this case is not an endorsement of website “small print” so much as a sensible refusal by the courts to impose costly duties of care on websites providing information to the public.

Gary and Karen Patchett were suing the Swimming Pool and Allied Trades Association (SPATA) after their swimming pool contractor – whose details they had obtained from SPATA’s website – ceased trading. The Patchetts claimed that SPATA’s website had failed to make it clear that the contractor was only an “associate member”, and thus not covered by SPATA’s insurance scheme.

The court held that SPATA did potentially owe a duty to the Patchetts, as the site was directed only to those planning to have swimming pools installed rather than the general public at large. However, SPATA was not liable, because (as Lord Clarke put it in his judgment), “when the website is read as a whole, it urges independent enquiry” before people made a buying decision.

In particular, Lord Clarke singled out the following statement on the site:

“SPATA supplies an information pack and members lists which give details of suitably qualified and approved installers in the customer’s area. The pack includes a Contract Check List which sets out the questions that the customer should ask a would-be tenderer together with those which must be asked of the appointed installer before work starts and prior to releasing the final payment.”

Had the Patchetts requested the information pack and members list, they would have seen that their contractor was not a full member of SPATA, and hence SPATA were not liable for the inaccurate statement on their website.

What are the implications of this for businesses with websites providing information to the public?

1. Don’t panic

Many lawyers will be taking this opportunity to encourage their clients to review their website “disclaimers”, warning them of the dangers this case poses to those who fail to do so.

However, the first lesson to draw from this case is the courts’ reluctance to impose a duty of case on website owners to those using their sites, even where a website is directed towards a specialised audience who are likely regard it as authoritative (as in the case of SPATA).

2. Be alert

That said, the case does show the need to ensure information on commercial websites is kept accurate. SPATA may have fought off the Patchetts’ claim, but the inaccurate and misleading information on their website will have cost them dearly in legal costs (not all of which they will be able to recover from the Patchetts), lost management time and adverse publicity.

SPATA were not saved by a legalistic disclaimer buried on an obscure corner of their website. Looking at their 2006 site on the Internet Archive, the statement about their information pack was set out on the first-linked page from their welcome page. There is every reason (including a famous Lord Denning judgment) to believe that the courts will look less favourably at the sort of small-print verbiage lurking on many sites behind the “Terms and conditions” link.

The lesson is not “rely on your lawyers” but “make sure you are clear and accurate in the first place”.

3. Follow the money

A final practical observation. The reason SPATA ended up in court was, in the end, because the Patchetts’ contractor had gone bust and had no money with which to compensate them. SPATA did have resources to meet a claim, and hence the Patchetts (quite reasonably) sought redress from them.

Even if your involvement in a transaction is pretty tangential – there was no direct contact between the Patchetts and SPATA, beyond Mr Patchett’s accessing their website – if you are the “last person standing” with any money, then you may well be a target for legal action. As observed above, this is a far from pain-free experience even if you eventually win.

This should concentrate businesses’ minds on making sure they get their website content right. It is notable that, looking at SPATA’s current website, they appear to have concentrated on removing room for misunderstanding rather than adding legalistic disclaimers.

That strikes me as the right approach – but (and you knew this was coming, didn’t you?) my firm’s insurers will want me to emphasise that (like everything else on here) this is my personal view and should not be relied upon as legal advice!

Getting the “red ink” out

There are some interesting parallels between construction contracts and IT contracts. Both types of contract often involve large expenditures in a project whose final outcome and parameters are not always clear. Both involve an interplay between how the project proceeds on an ongoing basis, and how the final delivery can be assessed and accepted. The resulting contracts are often highly complex, and negotiated against tight deadlines. And there are real dangers of the responsibility for important provisions falling between the “legal” and “commercial” representatives for a party.

A dispute involving the housebuilder Persimmon Homes shows the problems that can arise where a contractual clause in a complex contract turns out, once a dispute arises, to be far less clear than the parties may have assumed when the agreement was signed. Persimmon bought a development site in Wandsworth from a company called Chartbrook Limited. The agreement included provision for an additional payment to Chartbrook were Persimmon to achieve a higher price than anticipated for the residential units it built on the site. This “Additional Residential Payment” (ARP) was defined as:

23.4% of the price achieved for each Residential Unit in excess of the Minimum Guaranteed Residential Unit Value [MGRUV] less the Costs and Incentives.

Now, what does this clause mean in practice? Chartbrook and Persimmon soon came to blows over this, with starkly differing interpretations. Chartbrook argued that a literal interpretation of the clause meant that it should receive a total ARP of £4,482,862 – almost doubling the original price paid by Persimmon for the land. Persimmon argued that, taking the commercial purpose of the clause into account, the ARP should come to £897,051 – a healthy top-up to reflect the prices achieved for the flats, but now the near-100% uplift sought by Chartbrook.

The usual position in English law is that the literal interpretation of the contract should be followed, and this is the position followed by the High Court and Court of Appeal in the earlier stages of the case. However, when the case reached the House of Lords (whose judgment was issued this week), Lord Hoffman took a very different view.

Lord Hoffman argued that “something must have gone wrong with the language” in the ARP clause, and argued (on the basis of previous cases) that:

In such a case, the law did not require a court to attribute to the parties an intention which a reasonable person would not have understood them to have had.

“To interpret the definition of ARP in accordance with ordinary rules of syntax makes no commercial sense”, Hoffman continued. It was therefore open the court to apply “red ink” to the contract, rejigging the wording so that it accomplished what the court took to have been the parties’ mutual intention. He continued:

There is not, so to speak, a limit to the amount of red ink or verbal rearrangement or correction which the court is allowed. All that is required is that it should be clear that something has gone wrong with the language and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant.

There are a number of lessons for those involved in negotiating complex commercial agreements, not least IT contracts, to take from this:

  1. Those drafting clauses of this nature would probably be advised to make sure the agreement makes some reference to the commercial purpose for the clause. It is now clear that the courts will take this into account and, where the actual wording of the contract is wildly at odds with the stated purpose, may allow the commercial purpose to override the literal wording.
  2. One point not mentioned by the court, but which is apparent from the wording of the ARP clause: this looks like an attempt to turn a mathematical formula into legal text. In the process, “something has gone wrong”, as Lord Hoffman put it. There is a reason why mathematicians abandoned prose centuries ago in favour of formulas, and lawyers would do well to learn from them. Where a mathematical formula needs to be applied, why not just put that in the contract rather than attempting a translation into legal prose?
  3. I have no idea of the circumstances in which the ARP clause was worded, but my mental picture is of a hard-fought negotiation, possibly going well into the night, in which words were added into and out of the clause, but no-one had the time or presence of mind to try to put a few numbers through the clause to see if it worked. Those circumstances are almost unavoidable – but lawyers in particular would do well to try to keep a cool head when involved in such negotiations. While Persimmon may have won this case, the possibility that they might lose this dispute – at a cost of over £3.5m in additional ARP – may well have caused their lawyers a few sleepless nights, not to mention a claim on their PI insurance.
  4. Finally, does this case (as some have suggested) strike a blow against certainty of contract? This case does provide another weapon for commercial litigators to employ when faced with a clause whose literal interpretation is deeply unhelpful for their client. However, Lord Hoffman’s judgment makes it clear that the court will only depart from the literal interpretation where the literal wording “appear[s] arbitrary and irrational”, not where it merely represents a “bad bargain” for one party.

Tracking the terms

One of the perceived advantages of cloud computing services is the ability of service providers to update and upgrade their software in a seamless manner, without having to install new software on customers’ systems.

Unfortunately – from the point of view of customers – the same can apply to service providers’ terms of business, particularly on consumer-facing services where no written contract is in place. Many major websites routinely alter their terms of business, privacy policy and other key policies, and it is often difficult for users to see what changes have been made since they signed up. This has led to controversy on a number of occasions, such as when Facebook was forced to withdraw changes it had introduced, after protests by users.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has now set up a new site, TOSBack.org, to track these changes in policy on a range of major websites, including Apple, Amazon, Facebook, eBay and Google. It’s somewhat US-centric, but a number of the terms and policies listed will be relevant to UK users.

UK businesses need to bear in mind that the technical ability to change their online terms is not necessarily matched by the legal ability to enforce those terms. Terms in consumer contracts allowing unilateral variations to the terms are likely to be invalid under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 unless they are carefully drafted (see the OFT’s very helpful guidance on the Unfair Terms Regulations). Any change which adversely affects consumers’ rights is likely to be unenforceable, and may also give rise to harmful publicity, as experienced by Facebook.

How healthy are your software licences?

The Business Software Alliance is promoting a “Software Health Check” – a software licensing “self-audit” scheme to encourage businesses to ensure they have valid licences for all the software they use (and for all the ways in which they use it).

Software licensing can be highly complex, especially as virtualisation, multi-core processors and outsourcing transform how companies use their IT. There are probably few companies that are 100% licensed for all the software they use.

Of course, there is another side to the BSA’s initiative. I’ve noticed a trend in recent months for software companies to approach their customers demanding an audit of their licensing, and this voluntary self-audit scheme probably has a similar motivation: namely, software owners making extra efforts to ensure they receive their full entitlement of licensing and support income from existing customers, in a climate where new business is harder to come by.

And the BSA’s website includes prominent links for those wishing to “report piracy”. Again, this may be an important area of exposure for many businesses, as layoffs (not least in IT departments) may prompt disgruntled ex-employees to report their former employers for use of unlicensed (or “under-licensed”) software.

So it’s highly recommended that businesses take the hint and review their software licensing position. However, they should take care to note that each software licence needs to be considered on its own terms, and will need looking at particularly carefully if:

  • they are using software in a “non-traditional” way (such as virtualisation, remote access or “in the cloud”); or
  • they have grown significantly as a business since entering into their software licence agreements.

If in doubt (and you knew this was coming, but it needs saying anyway!): talk to your lawyers to check you are within the terms of your licences, and certainly talk to them (and quickly) if the BSA comes knocking on your door.

Football League cries foul against BBC presenter

The BBC’s technology correspondent, Rory Cellan-Jones, has been Twittering and blogging about YouTube’s removal of a video which he posted on the site.

The video was a 37-second clip of last weekend’s Brentford v Exeter City football match, which Cellan-Jones had taken on his new digital camera. It seems the Football League filed a complaint with YouTube alleging that the clip infringed copyright. YouTube responded by promptly taking down the video and threatening Cellan-Jones’s account with closure if he offended again.

Now it seems to me to be absurd to suggest that Cellan-Jones was infringing “copyright”. There is no copyright in a football match. As for the video footage, Cellan-Jones took this himself using his own camera. As this was (I assume) not in the course of his duties as a BBC employee, he is the owner of the copyright in that footage, not the Football League.

Could the football club (or the Football League) acquire the copyright under the terms and conditions for entry to the match? No: copyright (or future copyright in a prospective work) can only be assigned by an agreement in writing, signed by or on behalf of the copyright owner (ss.90 & 91 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988). So Cellan-Jones remains the owner of the copyright in the footage he took with his camera.

I haven’t been able to access Brentford FC’s ticket conditions, but I assume that (like those for fellow League Two team Leeds United (PDF)) they prohibit the use of video equipment within the ground. Hence – assuming Cellan-Jones bought the tickets himself – he was in breach of his contract with Brentford FC by using his camera. However, that does not give the Football League a basis for claiming under YouTube’s copyright notification procedures.

So, on the face of it, this looks like a spurious claim by the Football League: an example of how automatic detection and notification of alleged copyright infringements can lead to “false positives”. As a result, Cellan-Jones (having had a previous copyright notification) now faces the automatic closure of his YouTube account should a third “infringement” occur. Given that he’s unlikely to want to spend money consulting lawyers on an issue like this, his only practical recourse – other than writing a blog post on one of the world’s most high-profile websites! – may be to check out YouTube’s counter-notice provisions and decide whether he wishes to follow this rather formal (and far from risk-free) procedure.

Still, perhaps Cellan-Jones should count himself lucky. If those lobbying for a “three strikes” law for ISPs were to have their way, people in his position in future could even face the loss of their internet access.

Effective copyright: podcast link

As an update to my previous post, William Patry’s lecture (along with the introduction and Q&A) is now available for download on the SCL website. SCL members can complete the questionnaire to obtain CPD points using the link here.

Effective copyright in a networked world

Attended a very interesting and provocative lecture last night by William Patry, Senior Copyright Counsel at Google, Inc. and author of the 6,000-page epic Patry on Copyright, reportedly the world’s largest copyright reference work.

Patry was giving the SCL Annual Lecture in London. This year’s lecture was dedicated to the late Prof Sir Hugh Laddie, who died last year, and the topic, “Crafting an Effective Copyright Law”, was taken from a statement by Sir Hugh that “we do not need a strong copyright law, but rather an effective copyright law”.

The full lecture should be available on the SCL website before too long (and I’ll add a link when it is), and I highly recommend listening to it. Patry’s thesis was that copyright should not be treated as private property, but as a government programme to promote creativity and innovation by legislative means. Therefore copyright laws – and in particular any proposal to extend their scope – should be assessed on the basis of empirical data rather than appeals to what is “right and just” or the “moral case at the heart of copyright” (to quote Andy Burnham’s vacuous justification for extending the term of copyright for sound recordings).

I think Patry’s rhetorical characterisation of copyright as a government programme is a fruitful one, which can encourage a more level-headed assessment of copyright (and indeed other “intellectual property”) laws. Copyright is a good thing, but its effectiveness needs to be scrutinised continually, and it should be remembered its purpose is to benefit society as a whole by encouraging the creation of more copyright works, not simply to enrich copyright owners (not that those two ambitions are mutually exclusive, of course).

Equally, I think Patry overstated the case against treating copyright as a property right. He is correct that referring to copyright as “property” imports a wide range of legal, moral and emotional connotations which can be problematic (“An Englishman’s copyright proprietorship is his castle”, perhaps?). However, there is also a strong pragmatic case for treating copyright as property, in that it allows copyright to be assigned, licensed, bequeathed, valued and so on like other forms of property.

The big lesson, though, is that attempts to use copyright to protect business models that have been superseded by new technologies – not least the growth of high-speed internet connections and the “pervasive network” – is ultimately harmful to society and indeed to copyright owners themselves. Technology is going to drive new ways both of doing business and of accessing copyright material, and copyright owners cannot expect the law to protect them from the hard work of adapting to this. That’s just a bailout by another name.

An Open Platform – but read the small print

The Guardian’s launch of its Open Platform API is a fascinating example of how pervasive networking is encouraging radical experiments in new business models. The Guardian is loosening (some) control over its content in order to extend its reach as a global brand. In the wider picture, this is an attempt to break free from a business model that is seen by many as in terminal decline (printed newspapers) and find a new identity on the web.

Open Platform has two main elements: the Content API, which allows content from the Guardian to be integrated into other websites and online services, and the Data Store, which is a collection of data sets “curated” by Guardian journalists.

The Guardian’s terms and conditions for use of its Content API and Data Store are slightly at odds with the publicity about freedom and openness. Use of Guardian content is subject to detailed requirements to which website owners will need to give careful consideration before including content on their site. Terms of particular interest include:

  • The current free access only applies during the beta trial period. After that (or during the beta trial, if the need arises), the Guardian may introduce “alternative partnership models” – in other words, paid-for access for particular uses.
  • Websites using Guardian content must comply with the Guardian’s requirements. In particular, the site must not contain any illegal or discriminatory content, promote violence or illegal activity, or “be capable, in our sole discretion, of interpretation as racist, sexist or homophobic or promoting such views”.
  • Only 5,000 API requests can be made per day. So high-traffic website may find they need to increase their allowance of requests: which in turn may be an area of potential revenue for the Guardian (though this is not stated explicitly at present).
  • Content must be replaced or deleted every 24 hours. It cannot be retained in a static form for more than 24 hours.
  • The content must not be edited, translated or otherwise adapted.
  • A provision of critical importance: those using Guardian content under this scheme must carry Guardian advertising on their sites.
  • The Guardian can terminate access at any time without giving a reason.
  • The Guardian can use your name, logo and website address for promotional purposes.

So this is a long way from a Creative Commons-style free-for-all. In some respects it represents a “toe in the water”: allowing relatively small-scale access to unamended content. Clearly the Guardian’s concern will be to ensure that this move helps it generate advertising revenue, both directly from advertisements placed on participants’ websites, and by extending its reach and thus enabling it to raise its online advertising rates over time.

It will be interesting to see whether other newspapers follow suit, and if so whether they will take a more or less “conservative” approach than the Guardian in terms of retaining control over their content. At the very least, this provides a welcome contrast to the prevailing funereal tone of media coverage on the future of the newspaper industry.

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